Toms, Steven 
Introduction
The cotton textile industry in Britain emerged from regional financial and trading networks.
At the onset of manufacturing, capital requirements were small and could be easily satisfied from established local and regional credit markets. As the industry grew, capital requirements also increased, creating options for entrepreneurs in terms of accessing finance. The financial requirements of larger second-generation mills were substantial, and textile firms were therefore increasingly reliant on alternative networks to secure finance. For Lancashire based networks, Manchester was the most important centre for accessing merchant and later finance capital 1 through regional stock exchanges. Although a larger financial centre, London apparently had little to offer in terms of financial resources for further expansion in subsequent waves of industrial development. As the nineteenth century progressed, Lancashire and London remained on separate trajectories of development. Manufacturers were excluded from the expansion of the Empire in favour of the interests of the City of London. 2 Consequently the City increasingly specialised in bonds and overseas issues, where the proceeds, and associated fees, were much larger than the average industrial flotation in Lancashire. 3 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as some sections of the cotton industry formed large trusts, 4 London finance was nonetheless a viable option for these new larger firms. However, as the paper demonstrates, most of these very large firms shunned London in favour of regional networks. The paper aims to explain why this was the case.
This short historical sketch suggests that City of London's separation from the industrial economy in the north of England, that has characterised the twentieth century, and remains an issue today, has deep historical roots. A crucial consequence of separation is that the historical process of London's evolution as the major, and now dominant, financial centre in the United Kingdom, by definition excluded certain parts of the economy, thereby limiting and continuing to limit its key function: to redistribute funds to where they will find the greatest social return.
5
It was not the case that London investors found industrial ventures too risky. Michie notes that London investors' overseas portfolios shifted significantly from less risky government issues to more risky plantations, factories and mining between 1895 and 1914.
Established manufacturing firms did not necessarily need new finance, as they could rely on previous generations of accumulated capital. 6 However, the longstanding nature of textile production by 1870 did not stop the new larger mills in Oldham and Bolton seeking stock exchange finance, nor did it inhibit the trust movement of the 1890s. 7 Both of these developments deviated significantly from the inter-generational model of personal capitalism stressed in previous histories of the textile industry.
8
What then are the specific reasons for the separation between first industrial, and then corporate capital in textiles and the financiers of the City of London? How did the separation come about? The paper argues that the industry developed network relationships such that it became self-sufficient financially in the take off and initial growth phases. In the maturity phase, larger mills were financed mostly through regional pools of capital, but the preference for such capital was fixed by network inter-relationships established in earlier phases of 5 The key function as described by Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development, p.400 . 6 Cottrell, Industrial Finance, pp.269-270. Michie, 'Options, concessions, syndicates, and the provision of venture capital'. 7 Farnie, English Cotton; Macrosty, The Trust Movement. 8 Chandler, Scale and Scope.
development. As a consequence, as the industry expanded through the nineteenth century, it accessed more finance through established networks of connected individuals. The choices, or network preferences, of these individuals were crucial. In documenting these preferences, the paper answers the general question: What were the human factors that determined business network evolution and that explain the characteristics of the industry through its life cycle, including its rate of growth?
To answer the above questions, the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a theoretical framework is developed from three overlapping literatures. These are first, theories of networks and their evolution, second, theories concerning the evolution of financial centres and third, the literature on industry structure and economic performance, including entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial failure. The latter is important because the analysis of networks potentially complements, but does not necessarily fit into, neat descriptors of 'personal', 'family' 'corporate' capitalism, or correspond to an industrial structure dichotomy of integration or specialisation. The business history literature that overlaps with these three areas is integrated and finally prior interpretations of the rise and fall of the Lancashire textile industry are discussed so that the new interpretation offered in this paper can be specified. Section 3 introduces empirical evidence on the formation and evolution of networks using a chronological approach. Section 4 draws conclusions.
Theoretical framework and literature review

Network theory
The literature has consistently asserted that networks are economically important, in terms of transaction cost reduction, for example through lower contracting and information cost. There has been some debate about the extent to which the social aspects of networks promote 9 Casson, 'Institutional Economics'.
trust based economic activity, or conversely, represent some degree of market failure.
10
Empirical studies have produced evidence across a range of networking characteristics, including economic, social, religious, political, cultural and familial linkages, but typically only focusing on selected dimensions. More holistic approaches have argued that all these factors are potentially relevant explanatory determinants of decisive economic change such as diversification of business interests. 11 These developments should be explained iteratively stressing historical evolution and based on careful specification of network characteristics.
12
Other interpretations have suggested that network characteristics and their evolution are determined by transaction cost reduction through the process of hierarchy or market substitution and through the transparency or opacity of the social relationships involved.
13
The present paper takes these ideas a stage further, relating networking characteristics to two possible sources of competitive advantage. These are first: linkages that promote control of the value chain, which might include network type relationships that substitute for what otherwise would be formal integration, vertical or horizontal. Also included here are collaborations on technology, production and marketing processes. Second, there are linkages based on financial markets, whether credit or capital markets, which provide access to capital or reduce the transaction cost of acquiring capital. Competitive advantage is based on the accrual of rent from either source, by the dominant firm, or firms, within the network. On the one hand, abnormal returns accrue from control of the value chain associated with market or technical dominance at its crucial stages. On the other hand, abnormal returns accrue from control of, or discounted access to, financial markets. Rents are Ricardian, such that dominant firms can allocate them within the network, thereby controlling financial returns available to other network firms. Network evolution is also path dependent, such that the accrual of superior returns in one generation impacts on the diversification of the network in the next.
The pattern of diversification reflects incumbents and entrants' preferences to link with specific nodes defined according to the underlying duality. Their opportunities in turn depend on the evolution of financial markets and institutions, and the ability of networks to access and potentially control them.
Financial centres
The development of the industrial economy during the nineteenth century was paralleled by some degree of integration of financial markets. However, financial market and institutional development tended to lag, presenting industrialists with some degree of choice across a number of regional and metropolitan financial centres which mirrored the regional specific, unbalanced, distribution of economic activity post the industrial revolution. The section uses an extended multi firm, multi actor case study to trace a small firm of the early industrial period via a social network evolution to the trust movement of the late nineteenth century. The story begins with a small partnership using primitive technology and ends with the emergence of a powerful Lancashire-Scotland axis, led by J&P Coats. The narrative is constructed from diverse archival sources, including business level financial records, and contemporary publications. It follows an approximate chronology.
Innovation and early networks, 1790-1890
Up to 1830, increased productivity in spinning meant that a relatively small capital investment could sustain a larger network of outworking handloom weavers. The origins of our network begin with one such firm, Nathaniel Dugdale Brothers (NDB), which used small outlays in fixed capital to sustain a web of connected outworkers. Other prominent firms used similar structures, for example Cardwell Birley and Hornby.
27 From a financial point of view, the output secured from a low fixed capital investment in spinning could supply much larger productive investment in capital circulating with outworkers, which in turn could be sustained in parallel by a web of trade credit.
The self-financing nature of circulating capital tended to increase the returns to capital from this strategy. Following this approach, NDB sustained high returns on capital (ROCE) in 1797-1808 (23.52%) and 1815-1823 (34.22%). 28 In financial terms, NDB was a strong performer when compared to a sample of other early cotton firms. 29 As figure 1 shows, 27 Edwards, The Growth of the British Cotton Trade. 28 Where return on capital is defined as profit per the partnership books of account (which partners typically calculated as the difference between opening and closing values of net assets), plus appropriations of capital in the form of rents and interest divided by partners' total capital. 29 There are limited sources of surviving firm level financial data for this period. The financial details for ROCE calculations for NDB (John Rylands Library, Eng MS WP, 1208, Accounts) and the industry sample, consisting of an average of 7.93 firms per year and a total of 214 firm years between 1797 and 1823 is taken from a cotton financial database (CFD) compiled by the author from multiple archival sources (see Appendix 1).
although the profitability of NDB mirrored the cyclical pattern of other firms, its ROCE was consistently higher throughout and never fell below 10 percent.
NDB's financial performance was remarkable in view of its relatively small scale and primitive technology. NDB was established in 1797 with £1000 capital divided between Nathaniel Dugdale (1762-1816) and Taylor, Fort & Bury, and later Dugdale's brothers. In the first phase of its development, Dugdale used old technology (jenny spinning) in a spinning mill centred on the small town of Padiham, near Burnley. 30 In the 1790s the mule was generating rapid productivity gains, particularly for higher count yarns, 31 so the choice of jenny based technology was odd at first sight.
However, given the limits on productivity improvements in handloom weaving, cheaper investments in jennies would have been sufficient to create a balanced supply. Such a strategy made sense because the NDB spinning operation was not an isolated business and functioned as part of a traditional structure of outworkers. 32 The key to profitability was that one part of the process, spinning, could be partially automated in conjunction with guaranteed demand from the rest of the network. The firm invested in a new mill and warehouse, by 1812 using mule spindles. The resulting productivity increases kept spinning output in balance with an expanding network of outworkers. By 1803 the firm's capital had increased to £6,803 and it was employing around 300 handloom weavers, rising to 451 by 1810 and 699 by 1823.
33
The structure of the network, through family and business connections, provided the opportunities for growth. cash flow to meet these repayments, 35 even though the firm made a high return on capital, as shown in figure 1.
Following the death of Nathaniel in 1816, the firm was taken over by his son John, and became known as John Dugdale and Brothers (JDB). Hall suggests that in the subsequent decade the firm was beset by debt and financial difficulties. However the accounting records suggest otherwise. The firm's profits on all capital including loans averaged a 28.3% in the period 1815-1823, and in this time the personal wealth of the partners invested in the business increased around fivefold. Profits totalled £68,000 and the partners reinvested most of it. 36 So although some additional debt was incurred, the partners made significant investments in new capacity, including additional factories, machinery and warehouses. 37 Some of this investment was financed by family loans and a mortgage on the factory, although the debt diminished rapidly as a proportion of accumulated capital.
38
As the family extended their interests through a network of connections, these debts became more sustainable. Adam Dugdale, Nathaniel's youngest brother, had entered into a partnership with Thomas Hargreaves to take over Broad Oak printing works, Accrington, from Taylor, Fort & Bury in 1811. 39 The association meant that during this time, until JDB repaid all outstanding debts in 1827, Adam was able to underwrite some of the loans on the Lower House site. 40 The use of financial connections between businesses, and through personal intermediation, formed part of an expansion of a financial network that underpinned industrial and commercial activities. 35 Hall, Lowerhouse and the Dugdales, p.7. 36 Hall, Lowerhouse and the Dugdales, p.7. Thomson, 3868, 3870, [3880] [3881] [3882] [3883] [3884] [3885] [3886] [3887] . See also Baines, The Cotton Manufacture, p.285. evidence from other contexts suggests that university scientists with connections to industrial firms have greater social capital and greater propensity to become entrepreneurs as a consequence.
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Source: CFD (see appendix 1) As a consequence, the firm's investment in quality and its customer focus contributed to longer run and sustainable abnormal returns. Thomson Chippendall returned an average of 22.03% on its capital in the period 1811-1825 (see figure 2) . 48 The trends in the profitability 47 Audretsch, and Hinger, 'From entrepreneur to philanthropist', pp.29-30. On the death of Robert Hargreaves in 1854, Hargreaves's firm was transferred to F.W. Thread (1900), the FCSDA (1898), the CPA (1899) and the Bleachers' Association (1900).
Except for Horrockses, these combinations floated their shares on the London and regional stock markets, although London ceased to be important following the initial floats.
The startling result of these combines was the emergence of J&P Coats as the leading firm. Coats' dominance was exercised not just in the thread and finishing sectors, as is well known, but also though financial connections with the other major combines through regional financial networks and markets. There were three important dimensions: First, Coats was the only firm that utilised connections via London and the metropolitan social elite; second Coats enjoyed very high profitability relative to the other combines floated at around the same time;
third Coats used its financial strengths arising from these sources to reinforce the network connections, principally between Manchester and Scotland, that had emerged over previous generations. Each of these three dimensions is now considered in turn. 58 Coats was now in a powerful position, and able to influence the other combinations in the merger wave. The first of these was the English Sewing Cotton Company in 1897. There were no Lords on the board, although there were several JPs. In the absence of strong connections to London elites, J&P Coats acted as broker for the firm via its London office.
Other brokers were listed in Glasgow, Dublin and Manchester. Apart from the Coats holding, most interest was from numerous new retail investors. 78 The prospectus noted that the company aimed to maintain the trade of the component firms by promoting friendly relationships with other manufacturers. These included J&P Coats, which the prospectus noted, had a 'perfectly friendly' attitude and would apply for 200,000 shares in the ESC. Coats provided a loan at below market rates, which also allowed the ESC to offer a lifeline to its American Thread subsidiary. 88 Coats later took over its overseas ( William Graham Crumm's role included acting as trustee for the debentures, see prospectus: "The Calico Printers' Association, Limited." The Times, 14 Dec. 1899: 3. Houldsworth married Elisabeth Graham Crumm in 1862. Howe, 'Houldsworth'. 91 "The Calico Printers' Association, Limited." The Times, 14 Dec. 1899: 3. Shares at this stage had 7s 6d called up. Total capital issued by the CPA was £8.2m. The purchase price of the concerns taken over was £8,047,031, with a certified value of £7,693,504, with profits on equity capital (post depreciation) of £355,826 over the previous five years, thus averaging 4.6% of capital excluding goodwill. 92 Liverpool Mercury, 18 th December, 1899; Glasgow Herald, 19 th January, 1900 (quoting unofficial list) 93 Cook and Cohen, The effects of mergers, p.158. 94 Rose, Firms, networks and business values, p.174. financial support and restructuring in the combines is emerging; more will be said about the latter two firms subsequently.
In summary, the story of the merger wave firms considered thus far is of a financial network centred on J&P Coats. Coats had been the first firm to raise significant capital in 1891 and used its elite directors and London connections to achieve this. Once that was done, the firm then consolidated its position away from London on its traditional ManchesterGlasgow axis. Coats through its networked connections now became a prime mover in the reorganisation of significant sections of the industry through the four further new combines: the FCDSA, the ESC, American Thread and the CPA.
As the above analysis shows, these satellite firms had prior connections, which they chose to utilise to secure financial resources in preference to setting out new connections through London. The new combines had the scale to potentially interest London based intermediaries in new issues, but they lacked the necessary connections. Unlike Coats, their boards did not include elite directors with good connections to the City. Rather, their directors were influential through connections to northern political and civic networks, and in parallel, through connections to previously evolved Manchester-Glasgow axis under the auspices of J&P Coats. Consequently, as the new combines hit financial trouble in the early 1900s, Coats further increased its control of their operations and of their capital.
To assess the financial effects of this industry restructuring the return on capital employed was calculated for the relevant firms. Figure 3 shows the return to capital for Coats compared to an aggregate of the four firms that were subsequently invested in by Coats or provided with financial assistance during and after the amalgamation wave of 1897-1900:
American Thread, FCSDA, CPA and ESC. Table 1 shows further comparisons divided into sub periods before and after the merger wave, 1891-1897 and 1898-1913, between The figures show that in the period before the merger wave, Coats's profits were adequate but not spectacular. They were ahead of the cotton industry generally, typified by the smaller specialised mills of Lancashire, which were locked into stagnant export markets before 1896.
95 Conversely, they lagged Horrockses, which averaged over 14% returns during this period. After the merger wave was completed the situation changed radically. At just over 17%, Coats' profits in the 1898-1913 period were substantially higher than any other firm or benchmark, notwithstanding the generally positive trading conditions including the spectacular boom enjoyed by the industry generally in the period 1904-1907. As figure 3 shows the profits of Coats were persistently higher than the other firms in its immediate network and under its close influence. It is certainly the case that the profitability of J&P Coats was much higher following the merger wave of 1898-1899 than before, whilst the profitability of all the other firms within the Coats network remained sufficient to keep them afloat, but at the same time stubbornly low (figure 3). Ricardian rents were, it seemed, extracted by Coats as the dominant firm in the network. The difference in profits between Coats and ESC is illustrative. In view of the overarching control of ESC by J&P Coats, financially and over its main source of competitive advantage in distribution, and the similarity of their activities otherwise, the superior profitability of J&P Coats may well have reflected nothing more than its dominance within the financial network. 95 Toms, 'Windows of opportunity'. The Horrockses mergers were essentially a series of amalgamations, where preexisting independent businesses achieved some continuity in the merged firm. They thus had much in common with strategic amalgamations of partnerships of the early and mid nineteenth century. The scale of the Horrockses operation, however, meant that this model now needed adapting, such that the new board was the representative of the component firms.
As a consequence, in its board structure at least, Horrockses had much in common with the larger combinations that followed. The result, a combination with a capital of £773,000, was at that time the largest cotton-manufacturing firm in the country.
Hollins's business strategy was focused on mitigating the firm's dependence on
London. Most notably this included the construction of a new warehouse in Manchester. An important reason for the investment was that Hollins considered the London staff, inherited from the 1887 merger, to be unreliable. 102 To further assist its marketing operation the firm invested heavily in brands. In parallel to the expansion of the selling and retail capacity, production was also expanded with the construction of the new Centenary Mill (completed in 1896) and the acquisition of the Fishwick mills through the absorption of the Swainson Birley partnership in 1900. 103 The main problem faced by this new vertically integrated combine was the difficulty of selling into remote and difficult markets, in particular Latin America.
The firm had to rely on London agents to do this, notwithstanding the investment in Manchester, and this proved expensive.
104
Even so, the preference for brands over standard contracts was generally a successful one for Horrockses. Before the combinations of the late 1890s Horrockses was the most profitable of the merged firms, earning almost twice the average rate of return on its assets compared with J&P Coats (table 1) . It is noteworthy that it was only after the merger wave of 102 Howe, 'Sir Frank Hollins', p. 315. 103 Toms, 'The profitability of the first Lancashire merger', p.135. 104 Chapman, Merchant enterprise, pp.200, [304] [305] the late 1890s that Coats became industry leader in terms of its profitability, superseding Horrockses. Even so, Horrockses remained a strong financial performer compared to the other combines. As the firm accumulated capital the scope of its activities widened through selected investments in other businesses. These included the British Cotton Growing Association and the British Northrop Loom Company. 105 In short then, the emergence of the Horrockses combine was based on the centralisation of production assets in the north. A more diverse, brand oriented, distribution network was also controlled from the North as far as Association, a combine of fifty-three concerns. Remaining members of the executive or general boards were made up of representatives drawn from the Association's constituent mills. 106 Its prospectus was issued in July 1900 and applications closed 25 th July. According to the prospectus, its registered office was to be in Manchester, and its shares to be traded in London, Manchester and Glasgow. The share issue was not a success and, as a consequence, the vendors took up the ordinary shares. 107 As a result, the firm had few residual connections through London, but continued to grow its connections in the north and more firms applied to 105 In addition, Hollins was a director of the Manchester & County Bank and the London and North Western join the combine after the first issue. 108 The consequence was steady, if unspectacular, profits for the new combination (table 1) .
In summary, the trust movement had a significant effect on the structure of an important part of the textile industry. The evolution of the network, through technical collaborations, but more substantively through financial connections, resulted in an interconnected system of nominally independent businesses. The controlling network was firmly centred on Lancashire, particularly Manchester (through Horrockses, the Bleachers and the Coats was the dominant firm, in terms of its physical scale as a multinational conglomerate, but also in terms of its network influence. Unlike the other firms, Coats directors were members of the aristocratic elite and enjoyed international connections.
For the other powerful firms in the group, particularly the Manchester centred group of Horrockses, Bleachers and the FCDSA, political connections were important. These were exercised through the Conservative party. In the case of Horrockses, as noted earlier, political connections were established by previous generations of partners in the composite firms. Manchester.
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The Manchester-Glasgow axis described by these inter-connected firms was easily the largest and most powerful network. There were however, similar smaller networks. 114 The only large firm outside the main CPA and UTR combines was Accrington based F.Steiner & Co. Ltd, which had its own advantages in terms of process innovation in Turkey Red dyeing, patents, and scale in its distribution network. 115 As noted earlier, Lancashire firms like Thomson Chippendall had played an important role in developing the Turkey Red process.
The common feature of all these networks was their orientation to technical processes, usually patentable, or applied to design through copyright, and the finishing process, with its associated scale economies. Notwithstanding technical collaborations, by the end of the nineteenth century, financial ties were the dominant feature of these networked combinations.
Conclusions
The network preferences of the orchestrators of the combinations reviewed in the evidence presented above can be summarised as follows. Technical collaborations, underpinned by 110 family connections were the rationale for developing and extending networks up to the mid nineteenth century. The control of these embryonic production and distribution networks resulted in impressive financial returns for the firms in the central nodes. Subsequently, and
with the consequent accumulation of capital, these networks extended through diversification into textile related activities, but also banks, railways and overseas interests. Scale economies in distribution provided the rationale for the amalgamations of the late nineteenth century.
Prior accumulations of capital and pre-existing network connections limited the dependence of these amalgamated firms on the London capital markets. J&P Coats, with its elite connections, might have fallen back on London, had the need arisen. In practice, through the preferences of firms that were less financially successful it headed a network based on the regional financial centres of Manchester and Glasgow. In view of the scale of the mergers, the general absence of involvement by London finance is, at first sight, surprising.
However, the long run evolution of the networks, as described in the evidence above, illustrates the reasons for the orientation of the associated combined firms to the regions.
Indeed, the centralisation of production and ownership networks around these regional centres had a long history, borne out of technical collaborations, design led production, high profitability and capital accumulation within connected family networks and regional financial markets. The separation that appeared between London and the regions had long run consequences, particularly after 1920, when regional financial structures experienced systemic failure.
The networked capitalism that emerged in the long nineteenth century defies description as purely family, managerial, or financial capitalism, although in certain respects it combined all these features. In doing so, the leading firms in the networks combined innovative investment with financial amalgamation that resulted in large profits. To some extent, these profits came at the expense of the less successful, bailed out, firms whose 
